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Taming Negotiated Justice 
After four decades of neglecting laissez-faire plea bargaining, the Supreme 
Court got it right. In Missouri v. Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper,2 the Court 
recognized that the Sixth Amendment regulates plea bargaining. Thus, the 
Court held that criminal defendants can challenge deficient advice that causes 
them to reject favorable plea bargains and receive heavier sentences after trial. 
Finally, the Court has brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar. 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s opinion “opens 
a whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence (‘plea-bargaining law’).”3 
To which I say: it is about time the Court developed some plea-bargaining law. 
Justice Scalia’s objections might have carried more force half a century ago, 
before the Court itself blessed plea bargaining as a speedy, efficient way to clear 
congested dockets.4 But, having made jury trials too slow and intricate to 
function in all cases, the Court has long since given up on preserving trials as 
the norm. In a world where nineteen out of every twenty adjudicated criminal 
cases ends in a guilty plea,5 plea-bargaining law is hardly a “boutique” corner 
of criminal procedure; it should be central. Since even Justice Scalia 
countenances plea bargaining as a “necessary evil,”6 it behooves us to regulate 
that evil. 
 
1.  No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf 
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1399). 
2.  No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf 
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1376). 
3.  Id., slip op. at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
4.  See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 750-53 (1970). 
5.  See Frye, slip op. at 7 (majority opinion) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
6.  Lafler, slip op. at 12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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One can understand why the Court was slow to appreciate plea 
bargaining’s central importance. Until now, the Supreme Court’s docket and 
its sense of what is normal have been distorted by the waivers that guilty pleas 
entail. Guilty pleas themselves waive most rights, and plea bargains often 
contain additional waivers precluding appeals or collateral attacks on most 
grounds. Thus, the cases that make it up to the Court disproportionately 
involve convictions after trial. As I have argued elsewhere, that distorted 
perspective has sometimes caused the Court to adopt rules for jury trials that 
have perverse, unintended consequences in the real world of guilty pleas.7 Frye 
and Lafler may perhaps ameliorate that problem, by opening up claims of gross 
ineffectiveness in plea bargaining to appellate scrutiny even if the 
ineffectiveness caused the defendant to reject the bargain. If a defendant rejects 
a plea bargain and proceeds to trial, there is no waiver to obstruct appellate 
review. The Court may thus develop a better sense of how modern criminal 
justice actually works on the ground. 
The other flaw in Justice Scalia’s dissent is his assumption that nothing 
matters except for factual guilt, so no defendant can complain if he or she gets a 
longer sentence anywhere within the broad statutory range. To Justice Scalia, 
post-trial sentences set the norm of what “the law says [the defendant] 
deserves,” and anything less “embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal 
law, in which the State functions like a conscientious casino-operator, giving 
each player a fair chance to beat the house . . . .”8 But plea bargaining itself has 
spread so broadly that it has warped background post-trial sentences, leading 
legislatures to inflate sentences to give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining chips. 
Yet even legislatures and prosecutors themselves do not think that these 
inflated sentences are necessary, so prosecutors stand ready to bargain the 
sentences down unless a defendant is foolish enough to insist upon a trial. As I 
have argued and the Court has now agreed: “The expected post-trial sentence 
is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for cars: 
only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full prices as the norm and 
anything less as a bargain.”9 
 
7.  Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 
110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (offering this criticism of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000)). 
8.  Lafler, slip op. at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
9.  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011), quoted in Lafler, slip op. at 9 (majority 
opinion). 
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Nor do juries ensure justice by authorizing the sentences to be imposed, as 
Justices Scalia10 and Stevens11 have sometimes implied. At the time of the 
Founding, jurors had at least an idea of the sentences that their verdicts would 
authorize, so at one time they did authorize punishments.12 But today, most 
states keep jurors ignorant of the sentences for various crimes, so juries do not 
authorize punishments in any meaningful sense. Thus, the separation of 
powers on which the Framers relied to do substantive justice has broken down. 
Justice Scalia is right that fashioning a remedy for ineffective lawyering in 
plea-bargaining cases is far from easy. Specific performance is not always 
possible and may overcompensate defendants who are crying foul only with 
the benefit of hindsight and regret. Rescission, however, may under-
compensate defendants if the plea offer is no longer on the table. For example, 
cooperating defendants may have risked their lives doing undercover work or 
testifying at trial, and it is simply impossible to un-ring the bell.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion forthrightly acknowledges those 
difficulties and suggests giving trial courts flexibility: “Today’s decision leaves 
open to the trial court how best to exercise that discretion in all the 
circumstances of the case.”13 The Court wisely left it to lower courts to 
experiment with crafting workable remedies. That approach may require 
ordering prosecutors to reoffer expired plea offers on pain of having sentences 
overturned, vacating some or all convictions and sentences (particularly when 
mandatory minimum penalties are in play), or leaving the original conviction 
and sentence in place.14  
That remedial creativity does trench upon a prosecutor’s prerogative to 
charge and bargain, but that cost is worth bearing. Like judges in the equity 
courts of old, criminal trial judges must tailor remedies to construct solutions 
that approximate where the parties would have stood absent constitutionally 
deficient counsel. That will require a common law process of gradually 
developing workable standards through precedent. The majority even hints at 
going further, giving sentencing courts the power to reduce sentences to 
 
10.  See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-05 (2004). 
11.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
12.  See, e.g., Lance Cassak & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Reconsideration of 
Informing Jurors About Punishment in Determinate- and Mandatory-Sentencing States, 4 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 441-42 (2007) (noting that, in the American colonies, as in 
England, petit jurors could anticipate the sentences that would flow from convictions and 
“exercise[d] their power to mitigate death sentences that seemed unduly harsh, notably by 
acquittal”). 
13.  Lafler, slip op. at 16 (majority opinion). 
14.  Id. at 12-13, 16. 
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approximate what the expected postplea sentence would have been, much as 
civil trial judges have long used remittitur to reduce excessive damage awards.15 
In a case involving the loss of an opportunity to earn a cooperation discount, 
for example, courts could use that power creatively. They might estimate the 
sentence reduction that a cooperator would have earned; discount it by the 
probability that the defendant would not have been awarded the discount; 
discount it further to reflect the costs that the defendant did not have to incur, 
such as not risking his life performing dangerous undercover work; and 
possibly factor in the chance of acquittal that the defendant enjoyed by going to 
trial (without the benefit of hindsight). Such calculations are necessarily fuzzy, 
but the alternative to estimating sentence reductions is leaving palpable Sixth 
Amendment injuries entirely without redress, inflicting years of 
overincarceration. 
The division between the majority and the dissent is not so much a political 
one as a jurisprudential one rooted in biography and outlook. Justice Scalia 
approaches matters as an originalist former professor, regulating the 
eighteenth-century world of the Framers. Justice Kennedy, though an adjunct 
professor for decades, looks at the world as a seasoned ex-practitioner, 
responding to the realities facing the bench and bar in the twenty-first century. 
For the Sixth Amendment to remain meaningful in the real world of guilty 
pleas, the Court must translate its guarantee of assistance of counsel to apply to 
plea bargains and the sentences set by those bargains. 
 
Stephanos Bibas is a professor of law and criminology at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, where he also directs the Supreme Court Clinic. He 
previously served in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York. 
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15.  See id. at 12. 
